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Abstract
Three Essays in Public Economics
by Joylynn M. Pruitt

This dissertation presents three chapters related to each other in their application to public economics. In the study of how utility-maximizing or goal-seeking units achieve economic outcomes,
this dissertation presents results for a diverse range of agents including prosecutors and liberal arts
colleges.
Co-authored with Dr. Bryan McCannon of West Virginia University, the first chapter examines
an interesting feature of prosecutor elections, where the pool of potential challengers to an incumbent comes primarily from subordinates within the office. We develop a signaling model that
analyzes whether entry into the political race by a subordinate provides voters with useful information. We demonstrate that a challenger can strategically convey information about the incumbent’s
quality by entering the race. Anticipating this, poor incumbents exit. Thus, the model matches
empirical observations of rare contested elections and rather modest vacancy rates. Compared to
the situation where outsiders challenge the incumbent, the election mechanism is effective.
The second chapter addresses the disproportionate risks small liberal arts colleges (LACs) face
relative to national universities caused by economic pressures such as demographic changes and
shifts in schooling preferences. Because of this, it is important to study how efficient the most
at-risk collection of higher education institutions are. While other studies have examined the efficiency of elite LACs, these are the institutions most able to weather recent changes due to their
higher endowments. I use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the efficiency of nonelite liberal arts colleges. Using the 6-year graduation rate as the outcome of interest, my results
show that the average LAC outside the top 100 ranked LACs according to U.S. News & World
Report operates at 74 percent efficiency. These rankings are then evaluated as a function of school
factors such as location, religious affiliation, varsity sports activity, and enrollment. Results show
that suburban LACs with more majors offered and lower enrollment are more efficient.
Inspired by the extensive grants and funding recently spread throughout Pennsylvania via historical levels of public funding, the third chapter examines how well high-ranking public school
districts are currently using these resources. I employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the efficiency of the U.S. News & World Report 100 top-ranked school districts in Pennsylvania.
Two learning outcomes of interest are used: the 4-year graduation rate, and the grade 11 Algebra
1 Keystone exam results. The results show the average top-ranked school district operates at about
63.8 percent efficiency when using graduation rate as the outcome interest, and 68.8 percent efficiency when using Algebra 1 exam results as the outcome of interest.
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Chapter 1
Taking on the Boss: Informative Contests in
Prosecutor Elections
1.1

Introduction

Local prosecutors handle the bulk of the crimes in the U.S. (approximately 95% of all felonies)
(Simmons, 2004). Prosecutors are given an incredible amount of discretion in deciding how to
handle these cases (Bibas, 2008a; Kessler & Piehl, 1997). For example, they choose whether to
file charges or dismiss a case, which charges to file, the amount of investigation to expend, and
whether to plea bargain (among others). Their choices not only affect the victim and the accused,
but also have a significant impact on the public’s finances and on society through the deterrence of
crime. Local prosecutor decision making is a crucial component of U.S. democratic institutions.
Given the discretion endowed to prosecutors, it is appropriate to evaluate the quality of the
accountability mechanisms in place. Agency problems and public choice considerations can be
expected to be issues of concern. Important components of the prosecution process, such as governing the admissibility of evidence and the sharing of exculpatory evidence, are overseen by the
judge involved in the case. The judge’s role in monitoring prosecutor behavior is limited when
guilty pleas are negotiated outside the courtroom. Given that plea bargaining arises in approxi-
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mately 97% of felony convictions (Bandyopadhyay & McCannon, 2014), judicial oversight is an
insufficient check on prosecutors.
The popular (typically partisan) election is the primary mechanism to evaluate, motivate, select,
and retain chief local prosecutors in the United States. Residents of a county elect their chief
prosecutor to serve a four-year term directing crime’s prosecution in the jurisdiction. Re-election
concerns, then, are intended to provide proper incentives (Gordon & Huber, 2002).1
Scholars have criticized using elections as an accountability mechanism. Wright (2008) levies
a prominent example of this criticism. In his paper “How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us”, he argues
that the election mechanism is ineffective at aligning constituents’ preferences with prosecutors’
decision making. In establishing his argument, Wright provides empirical evidence that contested
elections do not happen very often. He observes in a nationwide sample of election results that
incumbent prosecutors are contested only 15% of the time. Thus, the low rate of challenging
incumbents, coupled with the poor information voters have on the prosecutors’ abilities and choices
made, provide the backing for the claim that the election mechanism is flawed. This has been
referred to as the ”accountability deficit” (Wright & Miller, 2010).
Along with the observation that contested re-elections are rare, Wright’s data points to other
interesting empirical regularities. Incumbent prosecutors seek re-election 75% of the time. A
seat is 2.2 times as likely to be vacant than it is to have a contested re-election. Thus, vacancies
are not that rare. Additionally, when incumbents do seek re-election and are challenged, the incumbents win only 69% of the time. These observations are confirmed in a complementary data
analysis by Wright (2014). There, vacancies occur in 28% of primary elections and 23% of general elections. Incumbents running for re-election face a challenge in 17% and 20% of primary
and general elections, respectively. Thus, vacancies are 1.7 and 1.1 times as likely as challenged
re-elections. Challengers win the contested election in 36% of primaries and 32% of general elec1

In some states in the U.S., county prosecutor offices are consolidated into prosecutorial districts. See Detotto
and McCannon (2017) for an economic analysis of this policy decision. There are five states that do not elect local
prosecutors: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Most states have four-year terms, but a
minority of states have six-year terms. See Detotto and McCannon (2017) for a description of a nationwide survey of
local prosecutor offices in the U.S.
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tions. Similarly, in a data analysis of prosecutor elections in North Carolina, Bandyopadhyay and
McCannon (2014, 2015) show that 31% of offices in 2006 and 18% in 2010 had vacancies to be
filled. Of those where the incumbent ran for re-election, 78% and 94%, respectively were uncontested. Hence, vacancies are 1.4 and 3.0 times as frequent, respectively, as contests of re-election
campaigns. This is substantially different than legislative elections, where vacancies are rare, and
contested re-elections are common. For comparison, in the 2014 U.S. House of Representatives
general election incumbents sought re-election 90% of the time, were unopposed 6% of the time,
and won 90% of the time when opposed. Further, in the North Carolina 2014 House of Representatives general elections incumbents sought re-election 92.5% of the time, were unopposed 51% of
the time, and won 89% of the time when opposed. Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2014) did not
report challenger’s success rates. Thus, consistent patterns emerge in data on prosecutor elections.
(1) When incumbents run for re-election they are rarely challenged.
(2) It is common for an office to be vacated.
(3) When contested in a re-election, the incumbent’s success is only modest.
Here we challenge the belief that low rates of contests are a symptom of poor institutional
quality.2 What the argument overlooks is the informational value of the challenger entry. Jobspecific human capital is needed to be an effective chief prosecutor. A reasonable candidate needs
not only to possess the managerial and leadership abilities to guide a bureaucratic office, but also
to have strong skills in prosecuting crime. Ironically, the pool of potential challengers who possess
these skills are the subordinates within the office. Challenging the boss, though, is costly. In
fact, it is standard practice that, if a subordinate within the office enters the election contest, that
2
In the conclusion we discuss the importance of Wright (2008)’s other claim - that voter information is a problem.
On this point, our analysis concurs.
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subordinate is terminated.3 Thus, along with the typical costs to running in an election (e.g.,
campaigning), prosecutor elections are unique in that they require substantial self-sacrifice out of
the entrant.4
Given that voters are likely quite uninformed regarding the skills and abilities of the chief prosecutor, the costliness of challenging the incumbent makes it an informative action for voters. If
a subordinate, who can be expected to be much better informed about the incumbent’s quality,
chooses to put her career on the line to contest her boss, voters can reasonably update their beliefs
regarding the current officeholder’s skills. We develop a theoretical model of this strategic information transmission mechanism. We show that, in equilibrium, low-quality prosecutors are much
more likely to be challenged than higher quality ones. Voters, recognizing this, are more interested
in voting for the challenger and replacing the incumbent. Thus, in equilibrium, low-quality incumbents are less likely to be re-elected. Considering the initial decision to run for re-election, we
show that low-quality incumbents are more likely to exit and pursue careers in other, complementary legal careers. Therefore, contested re-elections are rare. Vacancies are more prevalent, and,
conditional on a contested election, subordinates are rather successful. Thus, the model’s predictions conform to the empirical observations. Compared to the outcome that arises with outsiders
challenging the incumbent, the institution increases the likelihood of having a high-quality indi3

One may question the feasibility of the lead prosecutor’s ability to terminate employment on grounds of political
opposition, subject to the Civil Service Protection Act. The Supreme Court case Elrod v. Burns (1976) declared
firing an employee due to political ideology an infringement of the First Amendment (Bishop, 1978). However, one
judge stated that those in policymaking positions could be fired for their political beliefs. Without a clear distinction
between policymaking and non-policymaking positions, in Branti v. Finkel (1980) the Supreme Court later disallowed
the termination of a public defender because his policymaking powers were deemed limited (Murray, 1981). Yet, a
footnote in the case states ”this is in contrast to the broader public responsibilities of an official such as a prosecutor.”
Hence, the Supreme Court has not ruled explicitly on the firing of assistant prosecutors who challenge their boss. See
also Fazio v. City and County of San Francisco (1997) where, after the prosecutor fired a subordinate for challenging
him, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the Elrod v. Burns decision in that the assistant prosecutor is considered to be
a policymaking position and so the employment termination did not violate the First Amendment.
4
The other pool of typical challengers is the public defender’s office. Given the ’courtroom work group” phenomenon (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) of repeated interactions between the judge, prosecutors, and public defenders,
a contested election can be expected to have deleterious effects on the social interactions of the group, raising transaction costs. Therefore, the theoretical analysis is not limited to only considering contests by assistants within the
prosecutor’s office, but any agent with inside information who potentially bears a heavy cost to challenging the chief
prosecutor.

4

vidual holding the office in the next term specifically because contested elections are costly and
voters are poorly informed.

1.2

Literature Review

Our work is novel in that it is the first to formally explore the election mechanism for selecting local
prosecutors. We are not the first to explore the impact of asymmetric information in prosecutor
decision making though. The literature has primarily focused on the plea bargaining process which,
as mentioned, dominates the U.S. criminal justice system. Specific examples include the resource
conservation (Forst & Brosi, 1977; Landes, 1971), screening and insurance (Grossman & Katz,
1983), and informational values (Bjerk, 2007; Reinganum, 1988) derived from plea bargaining.
The roles of sentencing guidelines (Reinganum, 2000), investigative expenditures (S. Baker &
Mezzetti, 2001), unilateral versus bilateral consequences of informational deficiencies (Farmer &
Pecorino, 2010), discovery (Farmer & Pecorino, 2013), prosecutor elections (Bandyopadhyay &
McCannon, 2010, 2014, 2015), exoneree compensation (Mungan & Klick, 2016), and informal
social sanctioning of prosecutors (Daughety & Reinganum, 2016) have all been explored.
The election mechanism’s effect on prosecutor behavior has received attention recently. Gordon and Huber (2002) explore, theoretically, an election’s ability to incentivize effort. Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2010, 2014, 2015) consider how incumbents can use trials, rather than plea
bargaining cases, to signal to voters their skill to win re-election. Similarly, Nyhan and Rehavi
(2016) consider how political influences affect the decision to prosecute corruption cases. In empirical analyses of resource constraints, Rasmusen, Raghav, and Ramseyer (2009) and Detotto and
McCannon (2017) provide evidence that prosecutorial output is related to the selection mechanism
used in a state. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the role of challenger entry, which
has been overlooked in the cited work.5
5

The exception is Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2014) who in a robustness check use an IV approach to address
endogeneity of challenger entry. Their main result, that re-election pressures encourage jury trials and disincentivize
plea bargaining, is robust.
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We are not the first to consider strategic information transmission within elections (Kartik &
McAfee, 2007; Kselman & Niou, 2011; Lupia, 1992; Meirowitz & Shotts, 2009; Moretti & Suzuki,
2016; Razin, 2003). What is unique about our framework, other than our application to prosecutor
elections, is that we specifically consider the scenario where entry provides information about the
unobservables of the incumbent. This ”insider” revelation has not been considered previously.6
The closest work to ours is that of Gordon and Landa (2009). They too consider the informational value of challenger entry. Our work can be thought of as an application to prosecutor
elections, which fits closely the environment where voters are seeking out quality individuals and
where challenging an incumbent comes at a high personal cost. Our work is novel in that we extend
the environment to incorporate private market sorting and challenger screening. They, alternatively,
focus on factors that drive incumbency advantage. Our work, along with theirs, emphasizes the
importance of considering the informational effects within electoral mechanisms. Gordon, Huber,
and Landa (2007) also consider entry’s informativeness. The focus is on how the signal of challenger entry incentivizes voters to become informed on the incumbent’s performance. We differ in
that we emphasize the cost of being a subordinate when deciding to enter, and how it spills onto the
incumbent’s decision to run for re-election.7 A robust literature on judicial elections exists (Cohen,
Klement, & Neeman, 2015; Hanssen, 1999; Shepherd, 2009) but again does not consider entry’s
informativeness.8
The final literature that we contribute to is in regards to prosecutors’ career concerns. Here,
the emphasis has been on Federal U.S. Attorneys. Issues such as private benefits received with
the federalization of drug crimes (Glaeser, Kessler, & Morrison Piehl, 2000), turnover due to low
salaries (Boylan, 2004), the experience trials provide influencing assistant prosecutors’ decisions
(Boylan, 2005), and the relationship between sentence lengths obtained and favorable career out6
The point that inside information is needed to properly evaluate prosecutor performance is made by Bibas (2008b).
Lupia (1992), though, does not allow for an agenda setter to choose whether to propose the alternative.
7
They do consider environments where the voter chooses not to acquire additional information. Relatedly, Bevia
and Llavador (2009) consider the signaling value of incumbency and how incumbency advantage can be informative.
8
Lim, Snyder Jr, and Strömberg (2015) consider media attention’s impact on judicial sentencing and elections.
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comes (Boylan & Long, 2005) have been studied. We extend this discussion by focusing on the
incentive of the elected chief and assistant prosecutors within local offices.
In Section 2, the baseline theoretical model is presented. A straightforward environment is initially developed to provide a framework to evaluate the informational problem. The equilibria are
identified in Section 3. Section 4 extends the framework to consider the decision of the incumbent
to run for re-election, along with private market sorting. Section 5 concludes.

1.3

Model

Consider the following environment. There are three players, P = {I, C, V }. One can think
of I as an incumbent prosecutor running for re-election, C as a subordinate in the office who
may potentially challenge I for the position, and V as the voter.9 V can be thought of as the
median voter amongst the population of registered, participating voters. If majority voting is used,
then the Median Voter Theorem (Black, 1948) implies that the median voter is the decisive one.
Consequently, outcomes depend on its preferences. Thus, we will think of the voter as a single
decision maker who makes the retention decision.
First, nature determines the quality of the incumbent. Let t denote I’s type where t ∈ (H, L).
We refer to t = H as a high-quality incumbent and t = L as a low-quality one. I and C know the
incumbent’s type, but V only has prior beliefs. Let θ denote the commonly known prior belief that
I is high type, θ = Pr(t = H) ∈ (0, 1). Voters are assumed to care about the prosecutor’s quality
rather than policy differences.10
9

We do not explicitly consider the scenario where multiple challengers enter the race. If they did, one can think of
C as a composite candidate, or rather, the most viable from the voter’s perspective.
10
One can alternatively think of our environment as one where political competition drives platforms to the median
voter’s ideal position. As argued by Congleton (2007), complete convergence in policy is an implication of political
competition where voters lexicographically prefer policy positions to competence. This simplifying assumption allows
us to focus the analysis on strategic information transmission of ”rigid” characteristics rather than ”malleable” policy
discovery.
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Second, observing t, C makes a decision to enter the race and run against the incumbent or
stay out of the race and remain a subordinate.11 Let Ac = {r, nr} be the set of actions available
to C, where ac = r is the decision to run against I, and ac = nr is the decision not to challenge
the incumbent. Since C is informed of the state, this decision can be made contingent on the
realization of t. Consequently, let ρt denote the probability that C selects ac = r when the state is
t. Rather, ρt is C’s behavioral strategy, and ρ = (ρH , ρL ) is her mixed strategy.
Third, if C challenges I, then V must decide whom to place in the public office. Let Av =
{c, nc} be the set of actions available to V , where av = c is the choice to install C into the office
of chief prosecutor, and av = nc is the decision to retain the incumbent. Let κ denote the mixed
strategy selected by V , or rather, the probability V chooses av = c. If C does not challenge I, then
V has no decision to make, as the incumbent wins an uncontested election. Furthermore, since
V does not know the state, its action cannot be made contingent on t. V , though, can update its
beliefs regarding the true state. Let θ′ denote the updated probability t = H after observing C’s
entry decision.
Finally, payoffs are realized. Since I does not have any action to take, we do not model his
preferences.12 For C, her payoff depends on her quality of life in the next term. If she runs for
office, a benefit is possible and costs are incurred. Let the cost to entering the race be x > 0. This
includes the direct campaigning costs, for example, but also the opportunity cost of her time. If she
wins the election, a direct benefit is received, b > 0. This consists of the higher salary earned by
being the chief prosecutor, but also the reputational gains, rent-seeking benefits of holding office,
etc., which can be obtained. We normalize the benefit component of her payoff when she loses the
election to zero.
Alternatively, she can choose not to run against the boss. In this case, she receives a utility of
uc (t). An important assumption we make is that the subordinate finds working for a high-quality
11
We make the simplifying assumption that C’s entry decision is based only on the incumbent’s type and not, for
example, based on his own type. It is straightforward to verify that the main qualitative results persist when candidate
sorting is also added to the framework.
12
Section 1.5 will consider an extension to this environment where the incumbent has the opportunity to exit the
race or run for re-election. In the baseline model, though, we only consider the strategic information transmission of
the subordinate choosing whether to challenge the incumbent on voter’s behavior.
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prosecutor to be more enjoyable than working for a low-quality incumbent. A high-quality chief
prosecutor is able to allocate competently the office’s resources, effectively screen out weak cases,
avoid appeals of convictions, etc. The poor performance of the office’s chief, in short, makes the
subordinate’s job more difficult. Hence, uc (H) > uc (L).
We assume b − x > uc (t) > 0 t = H, L, so that if she wins with certainty, C would prefer to
take office. This setup also captures the observation that if a subordinate challenges her boss in the
election, she will most likely lose her job and move into the private sector, for example, which, as
stated has a payoff normalized to zero. Hence, the quality of life as a subordinate in the office acts
as the opportunity cost of running in the race. By assuming uc (H) > 0, the subordinate would
rather keep her job in the prosecutor’s office than work elsewhere in the legal community.
Finally, regarding the payoff to the voter, assume it only cares about the quality of the incumbent in the upcoming term. A high-quality incumbent mitigates type I and type II errors over the
course of the term. Therefore, V prefers the chief to be high quality and does not necessarily care
if the incumbent is retained.13 Presumably, V has received a payoff in the current period from the
protection provided. This protection comes from both the services of the prosecutor’s office and
investments put forth by law enforcement. Rather, in the current period V has received a payoff
of u′v . Assume V is unable to detect perfectly the inputs of the two providers of protection. Let
u′v (t, l′ ) be the utility derived from a type t prosecutor when l′ has been invested by law enforcement. Thus, u′v is observed if either t = H and a low amount of enforcement investment has
been made, l′ = L, or t = L and and a greater amount arose, l′ = H. Therefore, beliefs on the
incumbent’s quality, θ is derived from the current period observed payoff,

θ=

b
θλ
b + (1 − θ)(1
b − λ)
θλ

(1.1)

where θb is the prior beliefs before observing the current period’s payoff and λ is the probability
l′ = L. In the future period, which is what the voter is interested in improving when casting its vote,
13

Thus, we do not incorporate a direct preference for the incumbent as would arise, for example, when voters are
happier or in a better mood (Bagues & Esteve-Volart, 2016).
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the payoff is uv (t, l) where t is, again, the chief prosecutor’s quality and l is the law enforcement
investment. We assume l is a new, independent draw where from V ’s perspective it is a random
variable. Hence, let
Z
uv (t) =

uv (lt, l)dl

(1.2)

be V ’s expected payoff in the next period when a type t prosecutor holds the office in the next
term. Assume uv (H) > uv (L).
If V selects to install C, her quality is uncertain. Let ψ denote the probability that C will be
high quality. Since the cost of entering the race is not dependent on C’s ability, there is no way
for her to signal it to the voter. Hence, V presumes that if C is installed, she is type t = H with
probability ψ. An important assumption we make is that θ > ψ. Rather, the incumbent is more
likely to be skilled than the challenger. One can think of this as assuming the chief has more
experience and knowledge and, hence, is more likely to make good decisions than a neophyte.
Alternatively, previous elections have partially screened out low-quality prosecutors for the head
position.14
Thus, a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game is a profile ⟨ρH , ρL , κ, θ′ ⟩ such that
both players are sequentially rational and the beliefs are consistent. Figure 1 depicts the game.

1.4

Equilibria

We conduct our analysis of the game by using backwards induction. Hence, we first identify the
best response of V given C’s entry decisions. V ’s expected payoff for replacing the incumbent
with the challenger (choosing κ = 1) is

πv (c) = ψuv (H) + (1 − ψ)uv (L),
14

(1.3)

In Section 1.5 we will explore the consequences of an expansion of the model by incorporating sorting. The full
dynamic model, though, is suppressed here considering only the one-shot game. If this assumption does not hold,
then subordinates are expected to be of higher quality than their bosses. In this case, the informational value of entry
diminishes and, instead, voters are interested in replacing the incumbent.

10

Figure 1.1: “Taking on the Boss” Game Tree
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and the expected payoff to retaining the incumbent (κ = 0) is

πv (nc) = θ′ uv (H) + (1 − θ′ )uv (L).

(1.4)

Hence, the voter prefers to keep the incumbent when its updated beliefs of his quality, θ′ , are higher
than its beliefs regarding the challenger’s quality, ψ. Rather, the best response for the voter is

κ=0
if θ′ > ψ




BRv = κ ∈ [0, 1] if θ′ = ψ




κ=1
if θ′ < ψ.

(1.5)

Next, consider C’s decision making. The expected payoff to entering (choosing ρ = 1) is
κb − x, while the expected payoff to not entering (ρ = 0) is uc (t) when the incumbent is of type t.
Consequently, there exists a cutoff value for the probability that the voter replaces the incumbent.
Define this cutoff as κ
bt . For values of κ greater than this threshold, entering the race provides a
higher expected payoff. It follows that

κ
bt =

x + uc (t)
b
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(1.6)

and κ
bt ∈ (0, 1) ∀t. Hence, the best response for the challenger is

ρt = 1
if κ > κ
bt




BRc = ρt ∈ [0, 1] if κ = κ
bt




ρt = 0
if κ < κ
bt .

(1.7)

In asymmetric information environments, it is common for a degenerate, pooling equilibrium
where no information is conveyed to exist . This is the case here as well. If subordinates never
challenge their bosses, then voters have no reason to do anything other than retain the incumbent. If
voters choose to retain the incumbent, then costs of entering deter. As a consequence, the decision
not to challenge is proper.

Proposition 1. There exists pure strategy, Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria where ρL = ρH = 0,
and κ = 0.

The proofs of all propositions are presented in the Appendix A1.
There are not any other pure strategy equilibria. The rationale for eliminating others is straightforward. If C always enters, then there is not any useful information conveyed, and V prefers to
retain I (since θ > ψ). If C only enters when t = L, then V responds by installing the challenger.
This, though, incentivizes a challenge when t = H, since the benefit to holding office is great. Of
course, an equilibrium where only high-quality incumbents are challenged is nonsensical.
Additionally, as is common in signaling models, there is not an equilibrium where both types
enter with a non-degenerate mixed strategy. For both to mix, C with t = H and C with t = L
would need to both be indifferent between entering the race and remaining a subordinate. Since
the opportunity costs are differentiated, such an outcome cannot occur in equilibrium.
There exists an informative equilibrium though. It involves players selecting mixed strategies.
Hence, consider a mixed strategy, Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where C always runs when
she knows the incumbent to be low quality, ρL = 1, and with some probability runs when the
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incumbent is high quality, ρH ∈ (0, 1). With such a strategy, V ’s updated beliefs of the incumbent
being high quality is
θ′ =

ρH θ
.
ρH θ + (1)(1 − θ)

(1.8)

From (3), for V to be willing to choose a (non-degenerate) mixed strategy, θ′ must equal to ψ.
Hence, using (6),
ρ∗H =

(1 − θ)ψ
.
(1 − ψ)θ

(1.9)

C with t = H is willing to mix between ac = r and ac = nr when, from (5), κ = κ
bH .
Proposition 2. There exists a mixed strategy, Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where ρ∗L = 1,
ρ∗H =

(1−θ)ψ
,
(1−ψ)θ

θ′ = ψ, and κ∗ = κ
bH .

Therefore, subordinates challenge their low-quality incumbents. The challenger wins with a
positive probability. This allows for an improvement in the skill of the person holding the office.
High-quality incumbents are contested with a probability less than one, though. This opens up the
possibility of replacing a skilled incumbent with a low-quality neophyte.15
While identifying that the equilibria is straightforward, it is not clear whether the voting mechanism is welfare improving. To explore in more depth the impact of signaling by challenging the
boss, we extend the environment to allow the incumbent to choose, prior to the election, whether
to exit or run for re-election. This will allow us to identify the full impact on contested elections.

1.5

Extension to the Model

The previous section assumes that the incumbent always runs for re-election. I’s behavior is certain
and exogenous. In an extension to the game, we add to the analysis by allowing the incumbent to
choose to either run for re-election or step away from the position. An outside spot labor market
for attorneys exists and acts, then, as the opportunity cost of running for re-election. For Federal
15

Proposition 3 in Appendix A1 verifies that no other equilibrium exists.
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Assistant U.S. Attorneys the impact of outside labor market opportunities has been shown to be
quite important for understanding case handling (Boylan, 2004, 2005). Thus, we consider how
these factors influence local prosecutor elections.

1.5.1

Incumbent Exit

Let I’s ex ante probability of being high quality be denoted by θ̃ ∈ (ψ, 1).16 I’s stage-0 choice
is between running in the election (e) or retiring from the position in order to accept an outside
job offer (i.e., in the private market), AI = {e, ne}. One can think of the previous section as an
analysis on the following subgame when the incumbent has chosen to run for re-election.Let ω be
the value of the outside option when choosing not to run for re-election (i.e., wage). We assume it is
a random variable drawn from the continuous cumulative distribution function, F : [ω, ω] → [0, 1].
Regarding payoffs, I’s utility is similar to C. Let Pt be the probability that I is re-elected,
which may be related to his type t and is derived from the equilibrium presented in Proposition
2.17 Let bI be I’s benefit of retaining the office and let xI be the cost associated with running in
the election. The benefit and cost can be set equal to the challenger’s payoff values (bI = b and
xI = x), or they may be distinct. For example, one could imagine that reputational value of being
the known office-holder provides an incumbency advantage that acts to lower the costs needed to
run for re-election.
Thus, the expected payoff when I decides to stay in the election is Pt bI − xI , and the payoff
when I decides to exit is the realized outside wage ω. The best response for I is to stay in the
election when
ω ≤ Pt bI − xI ≡ ω
bt .

(1.10)

Thus, as a consequence, there exists a cutoff value for ω, denoted as ω
bt in (8), such that the
incumbent prefers to exit when his realized outside option exceeds this threshold.
16

For simplicity we focus on how exit can update θ, given V ’s observed current period payoff. In other words, we
consider how θ can be derived from exit alone.
17
Since there exist equilibria without entry there are also stage-0 decisions where Pt = 1 ∀t. Our objective of this
subsection is to explore how the information transmission affects the decision to run for re-election. Thus, we focus
on the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2.
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Since in the equilibrium presented, ρ∗L = 1 and ρ∗H ∈ (0, 1), it follows that ω
bH > ω
bL . Figure
2 depicts the partial sorting effect of contrasting exit decisions. If ω ∈ [0, ω
bL ], both low and highquality incumbents stay in the race. If ω ∈ (b
ωL , ω
bH ], then only the low-quality incumbents exit the
race. They are incentivized to retire from the position as these incumbents face a sufficiently high
probability of losing the election. For high-wage offers, ω > ω
bH , all types of incumbents exit the
race.18
Notice that, in this setup, if the incumbent runs for re-election and loses, a zero benefit is
derived. The framework does not preclude (or require) that 0 ∈ [ω, ω]. In other words, we do not
need to make a strong assumption regarding the labor market implications of losing the election.
Exit partially sorts when ω
bL , ω
bH ∈ [ω, ω]. Also, this simple stage-0 extension does not rely on
type-dependent wages. Job offers are made with the same level of information as available to
voters.
Consider V ’s belief that I is high quality, given the pre-election sorting that occurs. The previous results began with the exogenous probability that I is high quality of θ. In this extension, these
beliefs are derived from θ̃ and I’s exit decision. Hence, V ’s updated belief, prior to the election
but after the announcement of the incumbent’s re-election bid, that I is high quality is

θ=

θ̃F (b
ωH )
.
θ̃F (b
ωH ) + (1 − θ̃)F (b
ωL )

(1.11)

Because F (b
ωH ) ≥ F (b
ωL ), it must be that θ ≥ θ̃. The two are equal only when ω
bL , ω
bH ∈
/ [ω, ω].
In other words, the probability of electing a high-quality incumbent within prosecutor elections is
higher than the ex ante, ”no information” setting (prior to the campaign season). Sorting via exit
improves the voter’s assessment of the incumbent prior to the strategic challenge by the subordinate. The assessment of I’s skill is strictly improved when ω
bL ∈ [ω, ω].
18
Assume V cannot observe the realized value of ω so that retention cannot be conditioned on the wage offer
rejected by I.
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Figure 1.2: Incumbent Sorting
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Therefore, the full game’s equilibrium can be used to identify the probability of a vacancy,

P r(vacant) = θ̃[1 − F (b
ωH )] + (1 − θ̃)[1 − F (b
ωL )],

(1.12)

the probability of an entrant contesting the incumbent when he chooses to run for re-election,

P r(contest|reelect) = θ

(1 − θ)ψ
1−θ
+ (1 − θ) =
,
θ(1 − ψ)
1−ψ

(1.13)

and the probability that the voters replace the incumbent with the challenger when there is a contest,

P r(replace|contest) =

x + uc (H)
.
b

(1.14)

Contests, then, are rare when θ is close to one. Thus, the more sorting that occurs in the preelection stage when deciding whether to run, the less likely are the re-election campaigns to be
contested. Additionally, values closer to one decrease vacancies as high-quality incumbents are
more likely to run for re-election. Hence, contests and vacancies are inversely related. Therefore,
the empirical regularities of rare contested re-elections and modest vacancy rates can be justified.
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1.5.2

Mechanism Efficiency

The primary objective of the analysis is to evaluate the mechanism’s effectiveness. As discussed
earlier, low levels of political competition have been used as evidence in the argument that the
institution’s quality is poor. Hence, we want to assess its efficacy.
To evaluate the election mechanism’s effectiveness we consider the probability that a highquality individual holds the office in the term following the election. Our normative argument is
that the mechanism that improves this likelihood is a better institutional design. This coincides
with the voters’ utility.19 Therefore, we evaluate this probability in our framework.
First, as a benchmark, consider the situation where information is not transmitted. This would
arise if an outsider to the office challenges the incumbent. Also, it would arise in the counterfactual
case where an insider always challenges the incumbent, so that belief updating does not occur.
This could be thought of as the consequence of the policy argument that contested elections are
too rare, and efforts need to be made to increase the frequency of contested elections. Without the
information transmission, it is straightforward, given the parameters considered in the model, to
see that the probability of individual holding the office in the next period is high quality is θ̃. Since
the incumbent is more likely to have t = H than the outsider/subordinate, V prefers to retain the
incumbent. Consequently, there is no initial sorting, as the decision to run for re-election becomes
type independent. Since, in this extension, θ̃ is the ex ante probability of the incumbent being of
high quality, θ̃ is the probability of having a t = H officeholder in the next term.
Alternatively, consider the election mechanism with a subordinate having the opportunity to
challenge her boss. Prior to the election, the probability that the incumbent is high quality is θ̃.
After the decision to run for re-election occurs (with the partial sorting that arises), this probability
increases to θ. How well, then, does the re-election mechanism perform? The mechanism installs
a high-quality prosecutor if either (a) the incumbent is high quality and is not challenged, (b) the
incumbent is high quality, is challenged, but is retained by the voters, (c) the incumbent is high
19

A full welfare analysis would trade this off with the relative benefits I and C receive from holding the office
and the total costs associated with the election. Since costs increase with challenging, adding them to our normative
criterion would expand the support for rare contested elections.
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quality, is challenged, replaced, and the challenger is high quality, or (d) the incumbent is low
quality, is challenged, replaced, and the challenger is high quality. The probability of having a
prosecutor of type t = H in the next period is, then, the sum of these four probabilities,

(1 − ρ∗H )θ + ρ∗H θ(1 − κ
bH ) + ρ∗H κ
bH θψ + ρ∗L κ
bH (1 − θ)ψ.

(1.15)

It is straightforward to verify that the probability given in (13), using the equilibrium values presented in Proposition 2, is equal to θ. Since the previous subsection showed that θ > θ̃, the election
mechanism increases the probability that the prosecutor in the next term is high quality.
Therefore, the observation that there are few contested re-elections and modest vacancies
matches these results. The resulting normative claims differ. The election mechanism is working well when there are no contested campaigns. The ability to strategically transmit information
by challenging the incumbent is informative to voters. Since it is costly to challenge the boss, doing so increases the chance of winning. Anticipating this, low-quality incumbents exit so that they
do not run for re-election. Thus, vacancies and uncontested re-elections should be the norm. The
argument that prosecutor elections fail because elections produce low replacement of incumbents
from few challenges is not a sign of a poorly performing mechanism but the result of an effective
signaling mechanism.

1.5.3

Private Market Sorting

The analysis up to this point has made a strong, implicit assumption: the private market is unable to
sort out high-quality individuals. This was important in the model as we assume that the distribution of outside offers are identical for high-quality and low-quality prosecutors. In this subsection,
we explore the implication of relaxing this assumption.
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To allow for private labor market sorting for I, let FH (ω) denote the cumulative distribution
function for t = H’s wage offers. A more-reasonable assumption would be that FH (ω) ≤ F (ω)
e With this relaxation, this requires that
∀ω. Our main result is the illustration that θ ≥ θ.

θe ≤

e H (b
θF
ωH )
.
e H (b
e (b
θF
ωH ) + (1 − θ)F
ωL )

(1.16)

It is straightforward to verify that if FH (b
ωH ) ≥ F (b
ωL ), then this inequality holds, while if
FH (b
ωH ) < F (b
ωL ), then it fails. Therefore, the ability of the private market to sort affects the
ability of the electoral mechanism to sort.
To explore this tradeoff further, we make a simplifying assumption on the nature of FH (b
ωH ) to
illustrate. First, let λ capture the reduction in H’s cumulative distribution function, relative to L’s,
at ω
bH . A value of λ = 1 captures the assumption of no private market sorting, as assumed in the
baseline model analyzed previously, while lower values capture more sorting. Second, assume the
distribution function is additively separable where F (ω + a) = G(ω) + H(a). While not necessary,
this assumption allows for a more-simplified analysis.
With this framework, the main result of the paper requires that the updating results in FH (b
ωH ) ≥
F (b
ωL ). Rather, λ[G(b
ωL ) + H((ρH − ρL )bI )] ≥ G(b
ωL ). This simplifies to requiring that

G(b
ωL ) ≤

λ
H((ρH − ρL )bI ).
1−λ

(1.17)

There is, then, a trade-off between private market sorting, captured by the parameter λ, and the
electoral sorting, H((ρH − ρL )bI ). Figure 1.3 graphically depicts the trade-off.
The bolded curve represents the threshold. The baseline model is represented by λ = 1. At this
level, for all parameter values the electoral mechanism generates an improvement in the likelihood
of ending up with a high-quality prosecutor. Only if private market sorting is rather strong, and if
the updating wage threshold is rather small does the private market sorting lead to a nullification
of the main result.
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Figure 1.3: Sorting
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Additionally, though it seems reasonable to presume that the private lawyer market is able
to discern, to a degree the quality of the chief prosecutor, it may also be able to identify with a
reasonable probability the quality of the subordinate. A highly skilled subordinate could also field
outside offers. Thus, in other words, sorting should be expected to affect both parties. Using the
parameters in the model, private market sorting should lower ψ, the probability the challenger is
high quality. From (7) a reduction in ψ lowers ρ∗H , which reduces the gap between the threshold
wages. This is depicted in the leftward shift in Figure 3 to the dashed curve.
Therefore, considering private market sorting for both the incumbent and the subordinate reduces the environments under which the main result of the paper, that the electoral mechanism
improves the expected quality of the person holding the position in the next term, does not hold.
The main result is reasonably robust to private market sorting effects.

1.6

Conclusion

The objective of this paper is to explore the election mechanism’s effectiveness for prosecutors.
We ask whether it is problematic that there are few contested re-elections. To investigate this
20

question, we consider an asymmetric information signaling model when the subordinate’s decision
to challenge the boss, which is a unique feature that distinguishes prosecutor elections, has the
potential to inform the voters of the incumbent’s quality. Specifically because ”taking on the boss”
is costly, it is informative. As compared to the alternative of outsiders challenging the incumbent,
we show that the election mechanism is effective, as voters are more likely to elect a high-quality
individual.
One should take caution before singing the praises of using elections as an accountability tool.
Our analysis is novel in that we take seriously entry’s informational value. It is still far from first
best. As pointed out by Bibas (2008a, 2008b); Wright (2014); Wright and Miller (2010), there
are numerous additional concerns to have and many alternative interventions to explore, such as
internal oversight mechanisms and compensation schemes. The ability of subordinates to challenge
the boss improves the sorting. Our contribution is to highlight that, when the separation function
is working, contested re-elections are less frequent. Thus, low challenging rates alone are not
evidence of mechanism failure.
Wright (2008)’s other point − that voters are uninformed and thus unable to properly evaluate the incumbent − receives support here. The probability that the mechanism is able to install
individuals with effective skills depends crucially on their ex ante assessment (θ̃ in the model).
Improved information improves the mechanism’s effectiveness. Thus, our results modify the concern. Voter ignorance is the primary limitation. Given the rational ignorance of voters (Tullock,
1967), the problem lies in the public goods nature of voter competence (McCannon & Walker,
2016). Institutional design should focus, then, on this margin.
A number of simplifying assumptions are made to provide a tractable model. Relaxations of
these assumptions may prove to be informative. For example, the framework does not consider
the incumbent’s ability to alter the way in which cases are handled to influence how voters assess
the incumbent. One could imagine that taking more cases to trial or processing more cases to
reduce the backlog are activities that higher quality prosecutors are able to do more effectively.
Differentiating one’s self through case disposition may allow for partially revealing information
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for voters to use. Also, we do not consider the opportunity to engage in interoffice bargaining
between the incumbent and the subordinate. The model relies on sufficient frictions to make such
a negotiation unsuccessful.
Finally, the theory is motivated by a subordinate choosing to challenge the incumbent. The
theoretical model is not limited to subordinates, but rather applies to any insider with better information than voters, and experiences a heightened cost to challenging a high-quality incumbent. An
example would be the public defender who interacts repeatedly with the prosecutors office. The
adversarial system, then, can lead to increased conflict if the public defender challenges the incumbent in the election as well. While a comprehensive data set of the identity of those who challenge
incumbent prosecutors has not been developed (to our knowledge), the model can be extended to
allow for imperfect (but better) information by an insider. Prosecutor elections are novel in that
insider information, expressed through the decision to enter the race, can generate predictions that
conform to the empirical regularities in the data.
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Chapter 2
Efficiency of Liberal Arts Colleges: A Data
Envelopment Analysis of Non-Elite Liberal
Arts Colleges
2.1

Introduction

Private liberal arts colleges (LACs) offer important educational opportunities across a wide span
of regional and religious spectra. The Association of American colleges and Universities (AACU)
describes a LAC as an institution that provides a liberal arts education. The liberal arts are thus
defined as a set of disciplines that include humanities and the arts. LACs tend to have smaller
student populations and differ from larger national universities by “focusing solely on undergraduates – often offering few or no graduate programs – allowing more flexibility in the curriculum,
and emphasizing teaching that prioritizes a broad base of knowledge over professional training”
(Moody, 2018). With differences in funding, student population sizes, goals, and outcomes, LACs
may face challenges due to shrinking student populations or more recently, health pandemics, on
a much different scale than national universities.
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In the 2020 fiscal year, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, state funding of private colleges and
universities totaled 2.68 billion USD. By comparison, states spent more than 90 billion USD on
public colleges and universities (Whitford, 2021). Private schools funded through endowments and
alumni gifts face a unique challenge: how best to produce quality outcomes such as high graduation rates. When viewed through the lens of standard microeconomics, firms seek to maximize
profits yet private schools target outcomes such as prestige and graduation rates (Caskey, 2018).
Considerations like merit and need-based scholarships, varsity sports, and number of majors offered contribute to a school’s appeal. For schools that are labeled with an outstanding degree of
prestige, such as those in the top 100 nationally ranked liberal arts colleges according to U.S. News
& World Report, attracting quality students and reaching target outcomes may be more achievable
than for schools that are lower ranked. Thus, the need for an evaluation of liberal arts colleges that
are low-ranking and may face closure as a result presents itself.
While liberal arts colleges are consistently presented with the unique goal of maximizing graduation rates, they must also deal with inconsistent pressures such as the recent and ongoing pandemic, COVID-19. According to a study on the reduction of tuition rates during the 2020-21
academic year, over 300 private, nonprofit colleges and universities reported a reduction in tuition
for first-time, full-time first year students by about 53.9 percent and 48.1 percent for all other undergraduates (National Association of College and University Business Officers, 2021). Further,
there was an upward trend in aid awarded to students through grants. This significant reduction in
tuition and increase in aid as a way to attract students to attend college, despite public health risks,
poses potential financial challenges to schools already operating at low efficiency levels.
Furthermore, long-term consequences from events such as the 2008 recession also present financial hardship for higher education. A reduction in birth rates led to a decline in the number
of students, which in turn impacts enrollment for the 2020s (Briger, 2020). Low enrollment for
smaller private colleges can lead to closures, such as the three private colleges that closed in Vermont in 2019 due to a significant reduction in the state’s student population (Lindholm, Keck, &
Smith, 2019). Hence, while studies such as Eckles (2010) examine the technical efficiency of a
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sample of top ranked LACs, those at the bottom stand to lose more, both during and after the pandemic. Ultimately, this paper seeks to employ the same methodology used by Eckles (2010) but
focused on non-elite LACs and motivated by recent downward trends in tuition costs and enrollment due to COVID-19.
This paper presents two sets of results. First, it applies a similar methodology as Eckles (2010)
using data envelopment analysis (DEA) to determine technical efficiency scores for all liberal arts
colleges not included in his study that are co-ed, currently operating, and non-military affiliated.
Due to unique financial pressures presented by COVID-19, it is important to understand just how
efficient mid and low-ranking LACs are since they are most at-risk for closure. Efficiency in
Eckles (2010) as well as this paper is measured by a college’s output variable of interest: 6-year
graduation rate. The input variables used are average net price of attendance, percentage of fulltime faculty members, and the 25th percentile of SAT scores from incoming students. Second, once
the efficiency scores are determined for each college in the sample, they are evaluated as a function
of school location, number of majors offered, religious affiliation, availability of varsity sports, and
student enrollment. The results show that mid and low-ranking LACs tend to operate at an average
technical efficiency score of 74.4 percent, ranging from 32.9 percent (Brewton-Parker College) to
a tie for highest at 100 percent from four colleges (Principia College, McDaniel College, College
of St. Benedict, and Soka University of America).

2.2

Literature

Efficiency of liberal arts colleges has been previously studied by Bowen and Douglass (1971), who
focus primarily on efficiency via reducing costs while maintaining high quality outcomes. Qualitative in nature, their analysis proposes various alternative modes of instruction which essentially
promote creativity and freedom to learn and teach for students and faculty, or in other words, innovation (Force, 1972). While limited in scope, Bowen and Douglass (1971) establish the need to
understand what factors contribute to better outcomes from LACs. In the same vein, McPherson
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and Schapiro (1999) highlight the impact of shrinking student populations and changes in tuition
on the longevity of LACs and conclude that these colleges must be sure to attract high-quality high
school graduates. Stimpert (2004) acknowledges that economies of scale for national universities
may not apply to small private LACs. Lessons on efficiency, effectiveness, and asset utilization are
valuable topics for LACs to consider from their for-profit counterparts.
While viewing LACs as unique educational entities, O’Connell and Perkins (2003) summarize
the economics of private, not-for-profit LACs using three equations. The first represents the relationship between price and quantity to examine whether LACs are able to engage in price setting
behavior. Here, quantity of students Q is theorized to be a function of price P , reputation REP ,
and a set of other exogenous variables Z such as location and religious affiliation. The second
equation assumes REP is determined both by buyers and sellers in the higher education market.
Assuming REP can be paid for, it is a function of cost C, endowment EN , quality of the student
body T OP S, and lineage or age of the institution AGE. Lastly, the authors assume Cobb-Douglas
technology to model costs as a function of quantity and factor prices: C = {C(Q, P )} where P
includes faculty salaries, price for student inputs, and cost of capital. Using IPEDS data on 138
colleges identified as Liberal Arts I by the Carnegie classification, the results show significant evidence that LACs with higher reputations have more leeway with price setting. These colleges are
able to set prices below market-clearing rates so that demand is high. Reputation tends to depend
more on student quality and cost, and less on tradition. Costs per student can be mitigated by
increasing quality of student input. There is also evidence that financial aid is inelastic, meaning
increasing in spending on students may result in efficiency gains, however spending on faculty
does not result in an efficiency gain.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of efficiency of higher education, Breu and Raab (1994)
were the first to employ data envelopment analysis (DEA) to examine the top 25 nationally ranked
universities and top 25 liberal arts colleges. Using rankings of quality from the U.S. News and
World Report, they compare their measures of efficiency from the DEA model and determine there
is an inverse relationship. This implies high quality rankings from U.S. News and World Report
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were correlated with lower technical efficiency ratings. Ultimately, the authors conclude that this
is primarily due to U.S. News & and World Report’s tendency to list institutions as higher quality
based on higher levels of inputs like spending.
Eckles (2010) directly expands on Breu and Raab (1994) by similarly applying a DEA for a
sample of 93 national LACs. The study is primarily focused on simply ranking each institution by
its calculated technical efficiency score. By determining a production frontier for each institution’s
level of output for a given level of inputs, colleges that lie on the production frontier are able to
produce more output given a certain level of inputs. The colleges that lie on the production frontier
are considered to be technically efficient. Institutions that lie below their efficient peers for the
same level of inputs are considered to be technically inefficient.
Eckles (2010) utilizes six-year graduation rate as the output variable. The inputs used are cost
per undergraduate, percentage of full-time faculty, percentage of students in the top 10 percent of
their high school class, and 25th percentile of incoming students’ SAT scores. The minimum technical efficiency score for the entire sample of high-ranking LACs was 0.731, where the majority
of schools operated at a 90 percent level of efficiency or more. In other words, the majority of
schools within this sample operate at high levels of efficiency. Potential benefits of a DEA analysis
on LACs includes identifying peers for schools operating at technical efficiency scores below others with the same levels of input. This allows technically inefficient institutions to address certain
practices from their peers that could promote efficiency. This poses the question of how technical
efficiency scores from mid and low-ranking institutions from the same rankings compare to these
top-ranking LACs.
In further determining efficiency for higher education, Sav (2017) uses a DEA model and panel
data on state funding and Pell grants for a sample of U.S. public universities from 2004 to 2013 to
provide evidence that increases in state funding improve efficiency. Various measures of output are
used, including academic year production of undergraduate and graduate credit hours to capture
enrollment. Output of research is considered as well, measured as the ratio of reported expenditures on research to total expenses. Finally, six-year graduation rates are used as a production
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output. Separate results for constant versus variable returns to scale are shown, in which comprehensive (non-specialized) universities are estimated to be more efficient than research institutions.
Under CRS, comprehensive universities operate at close to 90 percent efficiency on average. In
other words, they perform at 10 percent below potential output given a certain level of inputs.
Research universities operate at about 10 percent lower efficiency on average than comprehensive
institutions.
This paper seeks to employ the same DEA approach to determining efficiency for a selection
of nationally ranked LACs, but with a focus on those that are not included in Eckles (2010). The
primary research question is how the distribution of technical efficiency scores looks for non-elite
LACs, based on similar inputs used in previous research, and whether efficiency can be explained
by college factors like location and religious affiliation. The importance of understanding efficiency for these institutions is embedded in the risk of closure facing many LACs in the U.S.
today.

2.3
2.3.1

Data and Methodology
Data Envelopment Analysis

In tandem with Eckles (2010), this paper calculates efficiency for each LAC by using data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA, first introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), constructs
a measure of relative frequency for each decision-making unit (DMU) using linear programming.
An efficiency measure equal to one refers to a DMU as relatively or technically efficient. Efficiencies below one coincide with DMUs that are technically inefficient. From the efficiency scores for
each DMU, a simple ranking can then be constructed to identify top and bottom-performing units
Ludwin and Guthrie (1989).
The goal of DEA is to construct tight input-output vectors, in which efficiency is determined
by a matching change in inputs or outputs (Ji & Lee, 2010). The DEA model can be either input or
output-oriented. This study employs the output-oriented model, in which outputs are maximized
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without requiring an increase in inputs. Further, DEA models can be specified according to specific
returns to scale, including constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). CRS
assumes all DMUs operate at their optimal scale, whereas VRS allows efficiency to be broken
down into technical and scale efficiencies (Ji & Lee, 2010, p. 268). A more detailed analysis of
the CRS and VRS DEA models can be found in Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker, Charnes, and
Cooper (1984), respectively. From Eckles (2010), an output-oriented VRS DEA is achieved by
maximizing θ subject to θ and λ where

− θyi + Y λ ≥ 0

(2.1)

xi − Xλ ≥ 0

(2.2)

X

λi = 1

(2.3)

Using DEA results, a production frontier can be developed to show units that are operating on
the frontier itself (efficient units) and those that operate on the interior of the frontier (inefficient
units). In essence, efficiency is shown as distance to the frontier. As such, it is a relative measure.
As explained in Eckles (2010), the technical efficiency score of each institution is the ratio of
the output determined by the production frontier given the institution’s inputs to the actual output
from the institution. As a result, technically efficient institutions (those that define the frontier)
will have a technical efficiency score of 1. These are “the institutions that did the most with what
they had to work with” (Eckles, 2010, p. 277). All other institutions in the sample that are not
technically efficient will have a score between 0 and 1. In general, higher technical efficiency
scores imply a greater degree of efficiency.
The goal of this study is to calculate technical efficiency scores for each of the LACs included
in the sample such that institutions of similar inputs may compare themselves to the extent that
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they might be able to locate slack, or waste, in their inputs and place priority on adjusting them in
an effort to become more efficient.

2.3.2

Data and Descriptive Statistics

Data on rankings of mid and low-ranking LACs was collected from U.S. News & World Report’s
website. The factors selected to determine efficiency are similar to those used in Eckles (2010).
The institution’s 6-year graduation rate is used to measure efficiency. The input variables are average net price of attendance, percentage of full-time faculty members, and the 25th percentile
of SAT scores from incoming students. Average net price is calculated as the amount paid by
the student after aid and scholarships are applied to the cost of attendance. The data come from
the 2019 academic year (the most recent year in which data is reported for all institutions in the
sample). Data on the input variables come from College Navigator, a website from the U.S. Department of Education for the 2019-2020 academic year. Any institutions with missing variables
are not included in the sample, as well as listed LACs that are categorized as military academies
and non-coed LACs due to their unique ideologies and missions (Eckles, 2010).
Eckles (2010) also includes the percent of incoming students in the top 10 percent of their class.
However this variable was much less reported for the sample of LACs used in this paper. As U.S.
News & World Report provides data on both the percent of incoming students in the top 10 percent
as well as the top 25 percent, DEA results were calculated for the sample which only provided data
on top 10 percent, top 25 percent, and lastly the full sample without using either of these variables.
A correlation test between the technical efficiency scores for each of the aforementioned samples
showed sufficient similarity to each other so this variable was ultimately dropped to avoid limiting
the overall sample size.
The sample contains a total of 164 LACs listed in U.S. News & World Report’s database on
liberal arts colleges in the US. The focus of this study is to analyze how efficient mid and lowranking LACs are, as these institutions are most at-risk for closure. These non-elite institutions are
defined as those outside the top 100 in U.S. News & World Report to contrast with the sample of
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Eckles (2010), who only evaluated the top 100 LACs. The sample encompasses institutions from
38 states. The range of enrollment is much larger than the sample in Eckles (2010), in which the
minimum enrollment is 311 students up to a maximum of 20,080 students. There are 50 LACs
located in towns, 18 located in rural areas, 52 in cities, and 44 in suburban areas.
Descriptive statistics for each of the liberal arts colleges are shown in Tables 2.1–2.4, separated
by their location. In general, it would appear that LACs located in cities tend to have higher
enrollment and a higher cost of attendance. They also have the highest maximum number of
available majors as well as a maximum of 100 percent full-time faculty.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Location = Town
Variable

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

SAT
Enrollment
Full Time Faculty
Majors
Varsity Sports
Average Net Price

50
50
50
50
50
50

984.68
77.74
790
1244
1668.08 825.53 360
3641
0.82
0.06
0.683 0.94
45.68
17.99
1
86
10.16
3.06
0
17
20378.82 3826.77 10432 27652

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Location = Rural
Variable

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

SAT
Enrollment
Full Time Faculty
Majors
Varsity Sports
Average Net Price

18
18
18
18
18
18

953.33
104.88 850 1270
1137.06 798.35 363 3381
0.78
0.13
0.53 0.98
34.28
15.63
2
75
8.33
4.01
0
14
19965.56 6680.43 7838 35421

As used in Archibald and Feldman (2008), Breu and Raab (1994), and Eckles (2010), the output
variable of interest is 6-year graduation rate, which the Integrated Post-secondary Education Data
System (IPEDS) defines as the total number of students who completed their degree within 1.5
times of the normal time as a percentage of the student body size.
Of the three input variables used in this paper, each is used to capture distinct elements of
a student’s likelihood to graduate. As in Eckles (2010), the 25th percentile of SAT scores from
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Location = City
Variable

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

SAT
Enrollment
Full Time Faculty
Majors
Varsity Sports
Average Net Price

52
52
52
52
52
52

977.08
96.88
770
1210
2498.69 3203.06 311
20080
0.78
0.10
0.57
1
47.40
20.38
6
94
8.48
4.19
0
16
22041.25 6367.23 10267 43042

Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for Location = Suburban
Variable

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

SAT
Enrollment
Full Time Faculty
Majors
Varsity Sports
Average Net Price

44
44
44
44
44
44

1054.64 77.93
930
1270
2309.66 1782.41 419
9934
0.79
0.12
0.46
0.97
45.57
20.84
1
88
9.57
4.68
0
16
24397.05 6452.79 10154 40630

incoming students is used to measure student quality. Students who score lower on the SATs
could be less likely to graduate, and vice versa (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Eckles, 2010; Zhang,
Anderson, Ohland, & Thorndyke, 2004). The percent of full-time faculty is considered to be an
indicator of “institutional effort” (Archibald & Feldman, 2008) in which LACs who employ more
full-time faculty, which are arguably more costly to employ than part-time faculty, may put more
effort into achieving higher graduation rates. In lieu of the cost per undergraduate used in (Eckles,
2010), this paper uses average net price of attendance (cost of tuition less any aid or scholarships)
in an effort to capture costs associated with graduation.

2.4

TEA Results

Using the DEA methodology described in Section 3.1, technical efficiency scores are calculated
for each of the 164 LACs in the sample. These results are reported in Appendix A2. There are
four LACs that share a technical efficiency score of 1, the maximum score obtainable. These are
Principia College from Illinois, McDaniel College from Maryland, College of St. Benedict from
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Minnesota, and Soka University of America from California. These institutions form the frontier
in which all other LACs are relatively less efficient by comparison.
The technical efficiency scores in the sample used in this paper have a much larger range than
the scores of the top-ranking LACs used in Eckles (2010). There, the minimum score was 0.731,
however in this analysis the minimum score is 0.3298. This result is not unexpected as Eckles
(2010) focused on LACs that are higher ranking and therefore more successful at producing a
higher level of output given a certain level of inputs. There are four institutions that received
technical efficiency scores between 0.30 and 0.40. These are University of Pikeville (KY) with
a score of 0.3967, University of South Carolina-Beaufort (SC) with a score of 0.3950, HustonTillotson University (TX) with a score of 0.3883, and Brewton-Parker College (GA) with the
lowest score of 0.3298.
The average technical efficiency score is 0.7439 with a standard deviation equal to 0.1550. The
median score is 0.7712. Compare these values with the average score equal to 0.795 and standard
deviation equal to 0.089 from Eckles (2010). There are 93 institutions with technical efficiency
scores above the average, so a majority of the sample is operating at above-average efficiency.
Overall, the distribution of technical efficiency scores is a slow taper from the maximum score of
1, with no major drop-offs between values. The results from Eckles (2010, p. 278) showed 69 of
the 93 institutions studied operating with a technical efficiency score of 0.90 or higher, whereas
only 25 of the 164 LACs used in this study operate at a score of 0.90 or higher. As a relative
measure, however, it should be noted that these efficiency measures are not directly comparable.

2.5

Explaining Efficiency

In order to further understand what factors may contribute to the technical efficiency scores for each
LAC, a regression model, given by Equation 2.4, representing the efficiency score as a function
of LAC characteristics is performed. The independent variables used are a dummy variable representing location classification (Town, Rural, Suburban, and City), the number of majors offered,
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how many varsity sports teams the school offers, a dummy variable for whether or not the school
has a religious affiliation, and total enrollment. These data also come from College Navigator for
the 2019-2020 academic year. The OLS results are shown in Table 2.5.

TE Score = α + β1 Town + β2 Rural+
β3 Suburban + β4 Majors + β5 Varsity Sports+

(2.4)

β6 Religion + β7 Enrollment + ϵ
The results indicate that institutions located in suburban areas are associated with higher technical efficiency scores. Schools that offer more majors are also associated with higher efficiency
scores. Enrollment, while significant, has a negative sign indicating that higher enrollment leads to
lower efficiency. This could be due to a more broad and diverse student population having a more
varying degree of student aptitude. However, the coefficient for Enrollment is very close to zero so
its impact on efficiency may not be as strong as location.
Overall, it would appear that LACs located in suburban areas with more majors to choose from
and with lower student populations are considered to be more efficient relative to LACs without
these characteristics. Interestingly, neither the presence of varsity sports teams nor religious affiliation is significant. One might assume that students who engage with sports teams on campus
might be more likely to retain better grades which could lead to a higher chance of graduation,
since most sports teams require student athletes to retain a certain GPA. Similarly, religious affiliations could create a tight-knit campus environment with a stronger sense of mission that might
foster a more successful environment for students. The insignificance of the coefficients for Town
and Rural could be explained by there being too few of these LACs in the sample.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of TE Scores
Variable

Coefficient

Town

-0.0165
(0.0283)
Rural
-0.0554
(0.0388)
Suburban
0.1092
(0.0287)
Majors
0.0031
(0.007)
Varsity Sports -0.0037
(0.0031)
Religion = 1
-0.0240
(0.0246)
Enrollment
-0.0000
(0.000)
Constant
0.6787
(0.0362)

***
***

***
***

Notes: Absolute value of standard errors
in parentheses. *** indicates significance
at the 1% level; ** 5% level, * 10% level.
N=164. Adjusted R2 =0.252.

2.6

Conclusion

Shocks to the higher education system such as the COVID-19 pandemic and lower birth rates pose
significant risks to the longevity of smaller, less efficient LACs throughout the US. Factors which
place financial strain on these institutions, such as lower than average student enrollment or tuition
cuts to encourage student enrollment, may place enough of a strain on the college to cause it to
shut down. According to an article from May 2020 (about 5 months after the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic in the US), MacMurray College in Illinois was one such example. After
spending three years in a budget deficit, the pandemic was enough to tip the scale toward closing.
The college had been in operation for 174 years in total. Lost legacies like this one example exist
throughout the US since the pandemic hit, and the aftereffects of it will be felt for years to come.
Because of this lasting impact, it is important for small LACs that do not have the prestige
of being in the top 100 ranked institutions to recognize and acknowledge inefficiency. As Eckles
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(2010) mentions, ordinal rankings based on DEA results should be considered with caution as
there may not actually be a large difference between the 25th highest technical efficiency score
and the 50th (pg. 280). However, the results do provide value in the sense that those LACs at
the very bottom of the list, operating at only 30 percent efficiency, could be identified and further
investigated for risk of closure.
The results indicate that the private LACs not included in the top 100 LACs examined by
Eckles (2010) operate at an average efficiency of 74 percent, given a similar set of inputs. Ranging
from a minimum of 32.3 percent to the maximum value of 100 percent, mid and low-ranking LACs
operate at a much more diverse level of efficiency than those in the top 100. This provides evidence
for the theory that mid and low-ranking LACs are most at risk for closure.
The characteristics of an LAC that are most likely to impact its efficiency are location, specifically those located in suburban areas, number of majors offered, and enrollment. While location is
not necessarily an easy adjustment to make for an LAC, the number of majors offered and enrollment could be important targets to identify and alter in order to promote efficiency.
The value of this analysis lies in the significant risk posed to low-ranking, inefficient LACs and
the ability of the DEA methodology to recognize units that are operating a low level of efficiency.
However, some limitations do exist, such as not accounting for LACs that offer more specialized
courses. This could explain why offering more majors is associated with a higher technical efficiency score, yet higher enrollment is associated with less efficiency.
Further research might include more variables in the OLS model to examine whether other
factors such as percent of the student body that lives on-campus or whether or not a meal plan is
offered in an effort to determine whether benefits provided by the school result in more or less
efficiency.
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Chapter 3
A Data Envelopment Analysis of
Top-Ranked School Districts in
Pennsylvania
3.1

Introduction

A recent report from the Education Data Initiative, which describes spending on public education
in the United States, concludes that education budgeting has fallen behind in relation to growth in
national gross domestic product (GDP). Despite this, nationwide spending per pupil on K-12 public
education has steadily increased since the 2012-2013 academic year. Pennsylvania ranks 10th in
spending on public K-12 schools, and 8th in funding, where schools in Pennsylvania spend around
$16,900 per pupil annually, which is higher than the national total of around $13,100 (Hanson,
2022).
States and local districts face continuous budgetary constraints and must utilize resources in
ways that optimize output given limited inputs. Public school funding can be influenced by changes
in local demographics, politics, and market forces (Denzau & Grier, 1984; Ikpa, 2016). In recent
years, Governor Tom Wolf has supported the expansion of education spending throughout Penn-
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sylvania. The most recent budget proposal includes an increase in $1.55 billion funding for basic
education. Over a period of seven years, an additional $1.8 billion was allocated toward public
pre-K through college education (Smith, 2022). While this may seem like a sizeable amount of
funding at first glance, and despite Pennsylvania’s high rank among its peers in terms of spending per-pupil, a recent article from the Pittsburgh Post Gazette casts doubt on whether the current
administration is contributing enough given the state’s current budget surplus of over $13 billion
(Goldstein, 2022).
The budget contains a variety of proposals to target the expansion of programs for special education and online coursework. A state representative further described the budget’s goals which
include programs to increase literacy, efforts toward accommodations of disabilities, and the allowance of dual enrollment within charter schools to increase teacher diversity and recruitment
(Goldstein, 2022). Overall, the budget would appear to be far-reaching in its overall goal of the
expansion of education opportunities, whilst addressing current national issues like teacher shortages, but it begs the question of whether or not schools are able to utilize extra resources efficiently
and achieve better learning outcomes. Expanding the production function of education in Pennsylvania via a historical level of public funding offers a unique opportunity to examine how schools
are performing along the frontier with current levels of input, and determine whether or not there
is room for improvement.
This paper provides two sets of efficiency rankings using data envelopment analysis (DEA) for
certain outcome variables of interest at the school district level: 4-year graduation rate and Algebra
I Keystone exam results. The input variables used are personnel (administrative, classroom teacher,
and coordinate services) totals per pupil, and their corresponding salaries per pupil at the school
district level. Using a sample of top-ranking public school districts in Pennsylvania, I find that the
results are similar to each other, regardless of which outcome variable is used. The DEA results
show that top-ranking school districts operate at an average technical efficiency score of 63.78
percent when using 4-year graduation rate as the outcome variable of interest, and an average of
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68.83 percent when using Algebra 1 Keystone results as the outcome of interest. The technical
efficiency scores for both sets of results range from 100 percent to percentages in the low twenties.
Using four-year graduation rate as the outcome of interest, seven school districts are ranked
highest at 100 percent efficiency: Juniata Valley, Downingtown Area, Penn-Trafford, Crestwood,
Central Bucks, Cumberland Valley, and Chartiers Valley school district. Using Algebra 1 Keystone
exam results as the outcome variable, ten school districts are ranked highest: Mars Area, Downingtown Area, Penn-Trafford, Crestwood, Central Bucks, Montour, Springfield, Fairview, Peters
Township, and Richland school district. Taking into consideration that my sample consists of the
school districts that are considered to be the best in the state, the average efficiency levels illustrate
that there is room for improvement in terms of input usage even among these top districts. Whether
or not the extra state funding will help technically inefficient school districts become more efficient
is yet to be determined.

3.2

Literature

The literature concerning the education production function is expansive. The basic model of the
education production function begins with student achievement as the output with various factors
at the school and socioeconomic levels as the input variables. As with most production functions,
increasing an input should result in more output. While the theory of the production function is
straightforward, the empirical results surrounding the effectiveness of increasing access to inputs
in order to promote more output is less so. Hanushek (2003) reviews a variety of studies on the
effectiveness of policies designed to promote better student outcomes by expanding inputs. The
conclusion is that most studies do not provide evidence for a clear and significant relationship
between student achievement and policies focused entirely on increasing the resources available to
schools. Further, Hanushek (2020) reports little significant evidence for the relationship between
increasing both teacher experience and financial resources with student achievement. Hanushek
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(2020) ultimately concludes that some degree of the lack of significance in many of the previous
empirical studies could be due to the focus on current levels of input, among other factors.
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the expansion of resources and
student achievement, a number of studies uphold the importance of financing education in pursuit
of student success (Jackson, Johnson, & Persico, 2016; Ladd & Hansen, 1999; Pike, Smart, Kuh,
& Hayek, 2006). B. D. Baker (2016) succinctly characterizes the role of financing education
in the promotion of better student outcomes. Overall, it would appear that spending per-pupil
has a positive correlation with student achievement, yet this is more true for some students than
others. Further, investing in school resources such as smaller class sizes and personnel salaries,
is positively associated with student achievement. State funding is also viewed as integral in the
betterment of student outcomes, with special emphasis on holding schools accountable for how
the money is spent. In fact, Picus (1995) summarizes previous work on school budgets and finds
that schools spend around 60 percent of their budget on student instruction. He concludes that
the impact of increasing a school’s budget on student outcomes may be limited in part due to new
resources being spent in the same way as previous resources.
Expanding upon the conclusions concerning the effectiveness of increases in a school’s budget
on student outcomes from Hanushek (2003) and Hanushek (1995), Pike et al. (2006) argue that
resources are commonly allocated in inefficient ways, stating the gains in achievement per dollar
from inputs relating to teachers are much lower than gains from other types of inputs. The authors
state that an accurate model of expenditures on education should take into consideration how much
influence educational personnel have on the allocation of spending, which may result in budgetary
biases toward teacher salaries over classroom resources. The proposal of an alternative theoretical
model of public expenditures on education is made, where the objective function of the utility
maximization problem facing schools (which maximizes both school and teacher utility) includes
a variable to signify how much weight is placed on teacher utility.
While theoretical and empirical analyses of educational expenditures and student outcomes
seems to be at odds concerning the true relationship between inputs and outputs, the literature
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focusing entirely upon school efficiency offers an alternative perspective. Relying upon data envelopment analysis (DEA), studies such as Rassouli-Currier (2007) and Ruggiero and Vitaliano
(1999) report results on the efficiency of school districts in Oklahoma and New York, respectively.
Ruggiero and Vitaliano (1999) finds that school districts in New York operate at an average efficiency level of 86 percent when using student test scores as the outcome variable of interest, The
DEA results are compared with results from using stochastic frontier regression and they are found
to be similar. Rassouli-Currier (2007) delves further into why school districts in Oklahoma are inefficient using both DEA and second stage Tobit regression. He presents DEA results for both
constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). The assumption of VRS creates an allowance for economies of scale, which may alter efficiency at certain levels. The results
show that schools operate at an average of 82 percent efficiency under the assumption of CRS,
and 91 percent under the assumption of VRS. The second stage Tobit results indicate that student
socioeconomic characteristics carry more weight in determining efficiency.
Badri, Mohaidat, and El Mourad (2014) also employ DEA on public schools in Abu Dhabi.
Using a set of endogenous (controllable by schools) and exogenous (not controllable by schools)
input variables, special attention is given to the sensitivity of the results to changes in which inputs
are used. The results show that changes in the combination of inputs and outputs does impact a
school’s efficiency score. Costs per pupil and costs per teacher seem to have the strongest impact on
school efficiency. Minuci, Neto, and Hall (2019) perform DEA on school districts in West Virginia
using data from 2008 to 2015. The authors use both graduation rates and exam scores as the
output variables of interest. Their input variables encompass personnel (administrative, classroom
teacher, counselor) usage and cost per pupil. The average technical efficiency score for each of
the three output variables used is around 93 percent. Their results portray little variation in the
efficiency of school districts throughout West Virginia, which they ascribe to policy homogeneity
at the state level governing how schools are able to use resources.
This paper follows in the path of previous studies that apply DEA on public schools in order to
determine how efficiently high-ranking school districts in Pennsylvania operate. With the passage
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of the recent budget that includes historical levels of funding for public school districts in mind,
the question at hand is whether schools are currently performing efficiently, and if there is room
for improvement or if slack is an ongoing issue meaning extra resources may not be implemented
efficiently.

3.3
3.3.1

Data and Methodology
Data Envelopment Analysis

Initially introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), data envelopment analysis is a statistical technique
used to analyze the inputs and outputs of a decision-making unit (DMU) in order to determine
how efficiently the inputs are being utilized. DEA offers a large degree of flexibility in its implementation. The inputs and outputs may take the form of many different types of variables
and can be measured in various units. Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1994) summarizes
three advantages of using DEA over other types of statistical techniques used to determine how
decision-making units compare to each other. First, DEA automatically assigns optimal weights to
all inputs and outputs in question, which avoids the issue of relying on policymakers’ preferences
in the assignment of weights. Within DEA, weights are empirically assigned on the basis of how
well a DMU ranks against its peers.
Second, DEA can simultaneously compare various performance indicators and provide a scalar
measure of which DMU is achieving best practices. In essence, DMUs can be processed based
on both allocative efficiency and technical efficiency (Charnes et al., 1994, p. 355). Allocative
efficiency is captured via the usage of costs per outcome or unit, whereas technical efficiency is
captured via resource usage. DMUs that are considered to be inefficient are inefficient because
at least one other DMU can produce similar levels of output using less input. Lastly, DEA can
determine the amount of resources that could be reduced to achieve the same level of output.
Further discussion on the advantages of DEA can be found in Ludwin and Guthrie (1989).
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DEA is an analysis of how a homogeneous group of DMUs rank against each other. The
technical efficiency score is essentially defined as the weighted sum of the outputs relative to the
weighted sum of the inputs (Talluri, 2000). The model can be oriented toward either inputs or
outputs. This study employs the output-oriented model, where the focus is on the maximization of
outputs without a corresponding increase in inputs. Previous studies of the efficiency of educational
institutions such as Eckles (2010) and Bessent and Bessent (1980) use this type of DEA model.
Assumptions concerning returns to scale can also be made. This study assumes variable returns
to scale (VRS), where efficiency can be broken down into technical and scale efficiencies (Ji &
Lee, 2010). This is in contrast with constant returns to scale (CRS), which assumes all DMUs are
operating at optimal levels.
Similar to the DEA model and assumptions used in Eckles (2010), an output-oriented VRS
DEA is achieved by maximizing θ subject to θ and λ where

− θyi + Y λ ≥ 0

(3.1)

xi − Xλ ≥ 0

(3.2)

X

λi = 1

(3.3)

The DEA results form a frontier in which the DMUs that are considered to be technically
efficient are located on the frontier, and DMUs that are technically inefficient are located inside
the frontier. Essentially, distance from the frontier marks DMUs as inefficient, and this distance
can provide enough information to provide ranks according to how inefficient a DMU is relative
to other DMUs with similar levels of input. Technically efficient DMUs will receive a technical
efficiency score equal to 1. Technically inefficient DMUs will receive scores between 0 and 1.
Technical efficiency scores closer to 1 indicate higher degrees of efficiency in comparison to DMUs
with scores closer to 0.
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This study calculates and reports technical efficiency scores for a sample of the top 100 school
districts in Pennsylvania, according to the rankings provided by the U.S. News & World Report’s
website. By combining the work of Eckles (2010) and Minuci et al. (2019), my goal is to investigate how efficient the school districts that are considered to be the best in Pennsylvania are. With
concerns over whether or not the largest budget proposal for public education in Pennsylvania is
necessary, the results shed light on which districts could take initiative toward reducing slack and
thus implement the increase in state-funded resources in more efficient, optimal ways.

3.3.2

Data and Descriptive Statistics

The sample of the top 100 school districts in Pennsylvania as of the 2020-2021 academic year is
constructed using rankings from the U.S. News & World Report. All input and output data for the
2020-2021 academic year is collected from the PA Department of Education (PDE) database. I use
input variables similar to those used in Minuci et al. (2019), which capture personnel employment
per pupil and pay per pupil. These include administrative personnel (and average salary) per pupil,
classroom teachers (and average salary) per pupil, and coordinate services (and average salary) per
pupil at the school district level.
I use two output variables to measure student achievement: 4-year graduation rate and the
percent of students who scored proficient or above on the Algebra 1 Keystone exam taken in 11th
grade. Passage of the Keystone exam is required for graduation and assesses proficiency in Algebra
1, Literature, and Biology. I drop Literature and Biology scores due to data availability. In addition,
math scores are frequently used in the education production literature due to their being normally
distributed across school districts (Cebula, Hall, & Tackett, 2017; Hall, 2007; Marcotte, 2007).
One school district is dropped from the sample because of missing data.
Descriptive statistics of the full sample’s inputs and outputs are shown in Table 1. Of note is
that classroom teachers seem to be hired and paid at lower rates than administrative and coordinate
services personnel. This is in accordance with recent public discourse over teacher shortages and
insufficient pay following issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Barnes, 2022).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Inputs and Outputs

3.4

Variable

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Enrollment
Graduation Rate
Algebra 1
Admin
Classroom Teachers
Coordinate Services
Avg. Admin Salary
Avg. Classroom Teacher Salary
Avg. Coordinate Services Salary

99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99

3056.16
0.97
73.53
0.005
0.07
0.01
72.62
44.84
47.83

2938.71
0.01
14.34
0.002
0.01
0.003
63.67
35.71
40.01

260
0.95
30
0.002
0.02
0.004
8.25
4.94
5.52

17573
1
97.4
0.02
0.13
0.02
363.19
183.49
203.32

TEA Results

Using the DEA methodology described in Section 3.1, technical efficiency scores are calculated
for each of the school districts in the sample. The rankings for each of the outcome variables are
reported in Appendix A2.1 and Appendix A2.2. Table 2 reports summary statistics of the technical
efficiency scores for both output variables.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Technical Efficiency
Variable

Observations

TE - GradRate 99
TE - Algebra1 99

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

0.64
0.69

0.18
0.19

0.26 1
0.24 1

Top-ranking school districts in Pennsylvania operate at an average efficiency of 63.78 percent
when 4-year graduation rate is used as the outcome variable, and 68.83 percent when Algebra
1 Keystone exam performance is used as the outcome variable. The correlation coefficient for
the two sets of rankings is equal to 0.73. There are seven school districts that are considered to
be technically efficient when using graduation rate, and ten school districts that are technically
efficient when using Algebra 1 exam results. These districts form the frontier for what is the
efficient production of graduation rates and Algebra 1 exam scores, respectively. There is some
degree of overlap between the two sets of technically efficient school districts. Four school districts
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received technical efficiency scores equal to 1 for both output variables: Downingtown Area, PennTrafford, Crestwood, and Central Bucks school district.
Downingtown Area school district is located in Chester County, Pennsylvania and includes ten
elementary schools, three middle schools, and three high schools. With total enrollment close to
13,000 students, it is the seventh largest school district in the state. It has a student-teacher ratio of
16-1 and 68 percent of students score at least proficient on state math exams. Penn-Trafford school
district is located in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania and includes five elementary schools, two
middle schools, and one high school. Total enrollment is around 3,800 students, with a studentteacher ratio of 18-1 and 73 percent of students score at least proficient in math.
Crestwood school district is located in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania and includes just two
elementary schools, one middle school, and one high school. Total enrollment is around 2,800
students with a student-teacher ratio of 18-1 and 60 percent of students score at least proficient in
math. Lastly, Central Bucks school district is located in Bucks County, Pennsylvania and incorporates a sizeable collection of boroughs making it the third largest school district in the state. It
includes 15 elementary schools, five middle schools, and one three high schools. Total enrollment
is over 17,000 students, with a student-teacher ratio of 15-1. Sixty-seven percent of students score
at least proficient in math.
Looking at this selection of high-performing, technically efficient school districts, it is apparent
that enrollment varies widely. What does seem to be consistent is the student-teacher ratio. All four
school districts operate at relatively similar ratios. While the literature examining the relationship
between increases in school spending and student achievement is not unanimous in its conclusion
over whether the relationship is positive, negative, or nonexistent, my results may indicate there is
an optimal student-teacher ratio. If school districts that are considered to be technically inefficient
are operating with lower student-teacher ratios than their more efficient peers, then it may be
beneficial for extra funding to target personnel usage.

46

3.5

Conclusion

Policymakers must overcome a variety of challenges whilst allocating resources among the many
services that demand them. Relying on theory to dictate policy is one possible solution to overcoming these challenges. Where education is concerned, the education production function offers
policymakers guidance. At its core, a production function presents the maximum levels of output
attainable given certain combinations of inputs. As one author explains: ”It summarizes technical relationships between and among inputs and outcomes. The production function tells what is
currently possible. It provides a standard against which practice can be evaluated on productivity
grounds” (Monk, 1989, p. 31).
While the influence of an education production function on policy may be questionable (Hodas,
1993), it does serve as a baseline for statistical analyses of school performance and resource usage.
Techniques such as frontier analysis, specifically DEA, focus entirely upon ordinal ranking of
decision-making units based on their ability to produce output given certain combinations of inputs.
Within the context of evaluating the efficiency of educational institutions, DEA can draw from
the inputs expected to contribute to student achievement from the education production function
literature.
Motivated by the recent budget proposal by the Wolf Administration in Pennsylvania, which
allocated over $1.5 billion in funding for public schools, this paper seeks to determine efficiency
of school districts that are considered to be the best in the state. If the school districts that would
be considered ”role models” for the remaining school districts are not operating at sufficiently
efficient levels, concerns could be raised over the usefulness of the extra resources being given
to schools. The results indicate that top-ranking school districts in Pennsylvania operate at 63.78
percent efficiency when using graduation rate as the outcome, and 68.83 percent efficiency when
using Algebra 1 exam results as the outcome. The lowest levels of efficiency for either outcome
variable are below 25 percent. The distance from technically efficient school districts to the most
technically inefficient school districts is relatively large compared to other DEA studies of educational institutions (Eckles, 2010; Minuci et al., 2019). However, due to the ordinal nature of the
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results, space between the top and bottom school districts should be regarded with caution. Ultimately the results portray room for school districts to adjust resource usage in order to become
more efficient. Whether or not the increase in resources will lead to more efficiency at the school
district level is yet to be determined.
Future research might incorporate spatial relationships between school districts, in which districts that are close to each other might inspire the adoption of similar resource usage strategies.
Spatial dependence and policy convergence has been studied previously (Coughlin, Garrett, &
Hernández-Murillo, 2007; Tian, Teng, & Guo, 2021) and there is room for the application to the
study of the efficiency of educational institutions. Further, comparisons across time of DEA results
before and after significant increases in resources available to schools (such as the 2022 budget
proposal previously discussed) could provide additional insight into how schools’ efficiency levels
change over time.
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Appendices
A1. Proofs for Propositions 1-3 from Chapter 1
First, we turn to the proof of the propositions presented in the text. First, consider Proposition 1.
Proof. Consider ⟨ρH , ρL , κ, θ′ ⟩ = ⟨0, 0, 0, θ′ ⟩. So long as θ′ ≥ ψ, it follows from (3) that κ = 0
is a best response. Since κ
bt ∈ (0, 1) ∀t, it follows from (5) that ρt = 0 ∀t is C’s best response.
Therefore, this is a pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 1 does not add any restriction on V ’s updated beliefs since the decision nodes are
not reached. Therefore, V can hold any beliefs about I’s type, so long as it does not believe that
I is less likely than C to be highly skilled, θ′ > ψ. It is worthwhile to point out that there exists
environments where these equilibria do not survive when reasonable refinements are employed.
For example, suppose uc (H) > b − x > uc (L). In this scenario, even if the challenger wins the
election with certainty, C knowing t = H would still not be interested in entering the race (but C
with t = L would). If this was the case, then the Intuitive Criterion, for example, would require
that V hold beliefs of θ′ = 0. Rather, since it is never beneficial for a high-quality incumbent to be
challenged, if a contest arises it must be against a low-quality one. With this refinement, none of
the pure strategies survive, and the equilibrium presented in Proposition 2 is unique. Alternatively,
if b − x > uc (H) > uc (L), the equilibria survive this refinement.
Now we present the proof of Proposition 2.
, 1, x+ubc (H) , ψ⟩. It follows from (5) that since κ = κ
bH >
Proof. Consider ⟨ρH , ρL , κ, θ′ ⟩ = ⟨ (1−θ)ψ
(1−ψ)θ
κ
bL , ρL = 1 and ρH =

(1−θ)ψ
(1−ψ)θ

are best responses. Given these probabilities, it follows that θ′ = ψ

is consistent. Finally, it follows from (3) that κ =

x+uc (H)
b

is a best response (recall that b >

x + uc (H) > 0 is assumed). Therefore, this is a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 3 verifies that the equilibria presented in Propositions 1 and 2 are all that exist.
Proposition 3. The strategies defined in Propositions 1 and 2 are unique.
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Proof. This proof is constructed through process of elimination of all possible combinations of
pure and mixed strategies. We start with pure strategies. First, consider the scenario where ρH = 0
and ρL = 1. In this scenario, θ′ = 0. From (3) κ = 1 is V ’s best response. This implies, from (5),
ρt = 1 ∀t. Similarly, in the scenario where ρH = 1 and ρL = 0, θ′ = 1. From (3), κ = 0 is V ’s
best response. This implies, from (5), that ρt = 0 ∀t. Consider the scenario where ρH = ρL = 1.
Because there is no new information for V , θ′ = θ. Since θ > ψ, (3) implies κ = 0 is V ’s
best response. Consequently, from (5), ρt = 0 ∀t. Therefore, there are not pure strategy Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibria within these scenarios.
Now we turn to potential outcomes involving mixed strategies. First, consider the scenario
where ρH = 0 and ρL ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, θ′ = 0 and θ′ < ψ. From (3), κ = 1 is V ’s best
response. This implies, from (5), that ρt = 1 ∀t. Next, consider the scenario where ρH = 1 and
ρL ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, θ′ > θ since ρL < 1. Thus θ′ > ψ. From (3), κ = 0 is V ’s best
response. From (4), ρt = 0 ∀t. Also, consider the scenario where ρH ∈ (0, 1) and ρL ∈ (0, 1).
From (5), κ = κbt , which implies κ = κ
bL = κ
bH . However, as shown κ
bH > κ
bL . Lastly, consider the
scenario where ρH ∈ (0, 1) and ρL = 0. Consequently, θ′ = 1 and θ′ > ψ. From (3), κ = 0 is V ’s
best response. This implies, from (5), that ρt = 0 ∀t. Therefore, there are not Perfect Bayesian
Nash Equilibria within these scenarios. Since this exhausts all of the possibilities, the equilibria
presented in Proposition 1 and 2 are exhaustive.

A2. Technical Efficiency Scores and Ranks for Non-Elite LACs
from Chapter 2
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Table A2.1: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings
Rank

College Name

State

TE Score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Principia College
McDaniel College
College of St. Benedict
Soka University of America
Grove City College
Richard Stockton College of New Jersey
St. Mary’s College
Concordia College-Moorhead
Houghton College
Providence College
St. Mary’s College of Maryland
Merrimack College
Stonehill College
Siena College
Westminster College
St. Vincent College
Lebanon Valley College
St. Norbert College
Gordon College
Sarah Lawrence College
Russell Sage College
Spelman College
Westmont College
New College of Florida
Christopher Newport University
St. Anselm College
Central College
Elizabethtown College
Calvin College
Goshen College
Mount Holyoke College
Mills College
Ripon College
Illinois College
Simpson College
Moravian College
Susquehanna University
CSU Monterey Bay
Hamline University
Lycoming College
Asbury University

IL
MD
MN
CA
PA
NJ
IN
MN
NY
RI
MD
MA
MA
NY
PA
PA
PA
WI
MA
NY
NY
GA
CA
FL
VA
NH
IA
PA
MI
IN
MA
CA
WI
IL
IA
PA
PA
CA
MN
PA
KY

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.986
0.982
0.965
0.960
0.959
0.957
0.955
0.954
0.953
0.948
0.948
0.942
0.938
0.931
0.927
0.911
0.909
0.909
0.907
0.906
0.899
0.894
0.892
0.891
0.890
0.887
0.887
0.883
0.881
0.879
0.873
0.873
0.869
0.856
0.854
0.852
0.850
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Table A2.2: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings
Rank
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

College Name
Hiram College
Whittier College
Franklin College
University of Minnesota-Morris
Nebraska Wesleyan University
Clarke University
Bridgewater College
Bard College
University of Mount Union
Carroll College
Alma College
Wartburg College
Mary Washington College
Chestnut Hill College
Carthage College
Wittenberg University
Erskine College
Salem College
Millikin University
Emmanuel College
Chatham College
Covenant College
Seton Hill University
Agnes Scott College
Wisconsin Lutheran College
Ohio Wesleyan University
Roanoke College
North Greenville University
Meredith College
Westminster College
Randolph-Macon College
Ouachita Baptist University
University of Dallas
Manhattanville College
Doane University
Alfred University
Guilford College
Berry College
St. John’s College
Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts
Stephens College
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State
OH
CA
IN
MN
NE
IA
VA
NY
OH
MT
MI
IA
VA
PA
WI
OH
SC
NC
IL
MA
PA
GA
PA
GA
WI
OH
VA
SC
NC
MO
VA
AR
TX
NY
NE
NY
NC
GA
MD
MA
MO

TE Score
0.846
0.845
0.845
0.842
0.839
0.838
0.838
0.836
0.836
0.834
0.830
0.829
0.828
0.827
0.827
0.827
0.827
0.827
0.823
0.822
0.821
0.821
0.818
0.818
0.817
0.817
0.817
0.815
0.812
0.812
0.811
0.804
0.802
0.798
0.794
0.791
0.790
0.789
0.782
0.774
0.772

Table A2.3: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings
Rank

College Name

State

TE Score

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

College of Mount St. Vincent
University of North Carolina-Asheville
Hastings College
Baker University
Claflin University
Monmouth College
Mansfield University of Pennsylvania
Benedictine College
Muskingum College
William Jewell College
Randolph College
Bethany Lutheran College
Evergreen State College
Northland College
Emory and Henry College
College of the Atlantic
Wells College
Wingate University
Hollins University
Cedar Crest College
West Virginia Wesleyan College
Maryville College
King University
Texas Lutheran University
Spring Hill College
Tougaloo College
Franklin Pierce University
Morehouse College
University of Virginia-Wise
Georgetown College
Albright College
Centenary College of Louisiana
Sterling College
Adrian College
Bethel College
Blackburn College
Virginia Wesleyan University
Thiel College
Schreiner University
Warren Wilson College
Thomas More University

NY
NC
NE
KS
SC
IL
PA
KS
OH
MO
VA
MN
WA
WI
VA
ME
NY
NC
VA
PA
WV
TN
TN
TX
AL
MS
NH
GA
VA
KY
PA
LA
KS
MI
KS
IL
VA
PA
TX
NC
KY

0.770
0.769
0.763
0.763
0.763
0.762
0.760
0.753
0.753
0.746
0.745
0.743
0.740
0.736
0.734
0.730
0.729
0.729
0.724
0.723
0.708
0.707
0.702
0.698
0.696
0.695
0.686
0.685
0.684
0.678
0.677
0.674
0.673
0.671
0.665
0.665
0.656
0.656
0.652
0.639
0.637
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Table A2.4: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings
Rank

College Name

State

TE Score

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Warner Pacific College
St. John’s College
Bennett College
Fisk University
Bethany College
Western Colorado University
Xavier University of Louisiana
Rockford College
Peace College
Philander Smith College
University of Pittsburgh-Bradford
Oglethorpe University
Coastal Carolina University
Young Harris College
LaGrange College
Fort Lewis College
Holy Cross College
University of Wisconsin-Superior
University of Wisconsin-Parkside
Louisiana State University-Alexandria
Huntingdon College
Mesa State College
University of Hawaii-Hilo
Bethune-Cookman University
Williams Baptist University
University of Main-Presque Isle
Brevard College
McPherson College
Virginia Union University
University of Maine-Machias
Greensboro College
Colorado State University-Pueblo
Ferrum College
Metropolitan State College of Denver
Chowan University
Bethel University
Shawnee State University
University of Pikeville
University of South Carolina-Beaufort
Huston-Tillotson University
Brewton-Parker College

OR
NM
NC
TN
WV
CO
LA
IL
NC
AR
PA
GA
SC
GA
GA
CO
IN
WI
WI
LA
AL
CO
HI
FL
AR
ME
NC
KS
VA
ME
NC
CO
VA
CO
NC
TN
OH
KY
SC
TX
GA

0.632
0.624
0.621
0.615
0.605
0.603
0.602
0.602
0.599
0.597
0.597
0.588
0.578
0.577
0.572
0.562
0.554
0.551
0.547
0.547
0.545
0.541
0.533
0.524
0.522
0.517
0.504
0.500
0.494
0.490
0.489
0.479
0.443
0.426
0.423
0.417
0.414
0.397
0.395
0.388
0.330
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A3. Technical Efficiency Scores and Ranks for School Districts:
Graduation Rate
Table A3.1: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings: Graduation Rate
Rank

School District

TE Score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Juniata Valley
Downingtown Area
Penn-Trafford
Crestwood
Central Bucks
Cumberland Valley
Chartiers Valley
North Hills
West Chester Area
Mars Area
North Allegheny
Canon-McMillan
Council Rock
Owen J Roberts
Seneca Valley
South Fayette Township
Abington
Peters Township
Tredyffrin-Easttown
Pine-Richland
Mt Lebanon
Greater Latrobe
Montour
Springfield
Dallas
Upper Saint Clair
Abington Heights
Elizabethtown Area
Carmichaels Area
Octorara Area
West Jefferson Hills
Lower Merion
Unionville-Chadds Ford
Exeter Township
Penncrest
Wissahickon
West Allegheny
Great Valley
Franklin Regional

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.925
0.924
0.924
0.883
0.872
0.870
0.866
0.858
0.842
0.823
0.819
0.788
0.785
0.782
0.782
0.768
0.762
0.748
0.741
0.734
0.731
0.731
0.721
0.714
0.707
0.704
0.701
0.695
0.683
0.676
0.672
0.671

67

Table A3.2: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings: Graduation Rate
Rank

School District

TE Score

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Tyrone Area
Canton Area
Shaler Area
Bethel Park
South Butler County
Methacton
Fox Chapel Area
Fairview
Upper Dublin
Upper Moreland Township
Radnor Township
North Pocono
Mohawk Area
Hatboro-Horsham
Westmont Hilltop
East Lycoming
Richland
Penns Valley Area
Greenville Area
Forest Hills
Hampton Township
Lewisburg Area
Lake-Lehman
Freeport Area
Brentwood Borough
Laurel
Chestnut Ridge
Farrell Area
Lower Moreland Township
Bedford Area
Burrell
Fort Cherry
Turkeyfoot Valley Area
Homer-Center
Millersburg Area
United
South Eastern
Bermudian Springs
Northwestern Lehigh

0.670
0.662
0.660
0.653
0.650
0.647
0.638
0.638
0.637
0.633
0.625
0.621
0.606
0.605
0.604
0.601
0.597
0.594
0.589
0.586
0.584
0.579
0.577
0.571
0.571
0.553
0.548
0.538
0.536
0.535
0.533
0.528
0.526
0.518
0.509
0.507
0.504
0.504
0.490
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Table A3.3: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings: Graduation Rate
Rank

School District

TE Score

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Reynolds
Neshannock Township
Oley Valley
Wyomissing Area
Claysburg-Kimmel
Valley Grove
Fairfield Area
Quaker Valley
Williamsburg Community
Brockway Area
Line Mountain
North Star
Allegheny Valley
Berlin Brothersvalley
Clarion Area
Jenkintown
Avella Area
West Middlesex Area
Jamestown Area
Shanksville-Stonycreek
Salisbury-Elk Lick

0.487
0.480
0.475
0.467
0.460
0.455
0.447
0.434
0.427
0.421
0.421
0.419
0.416
0.398
0.395
0.369
0.352
0.323
0.321
0.292
0.255
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F

Technical Efficiency Scores and Ranks for School Districts:
Algebra 1 Exam Results
Table A3.1: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings: Algebra 1
Rank

School District

TE Score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Mars Area
Downingtown Area
Penn-Trafford
Crestwood
Central Bucks
Montour
Springfield
Fairview
Peters Township
Richland
Council Rock
Canon-McMillan
South Fayette Township
Tredyffrin-Easttown
Pine-Richland
Cumberland Valley
Mt Lebanon
Upper Saint Clair
North Allegheny
North Hills
Wissahickon
West Chester Area
Upper Moreland Township
Great Valley
Unionville-Chadds Ford
Owen J Roberts
Franklin Regional
Juniata Valley
Abington Heights
Tyrone Area
West Jefferson Hills
Lewisburg Area
Lower Moreland Township
Hampton Township
Seneca Valley
Greater Latrobe
Radnor Township
Fox Chapel Area
West Allegheny

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.971
0.968
0.960
0.953
0.934
0.923
0.887
0.884
0.881
0.880
0.877
0.877
0.862
0.851
0.850
0.850
0.836
0.830
0.822
0.821
0.815
0.807
0.797
0.794
0.771
0.753
0.750
0.749
0.749
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Table A3.2: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings: Algebra 1
Rank

School District

TE Score

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Dallas
Methacton
Lower Merion
Freeport Area
Forest Hills
Exeter Township
Claysburg-Kimmel
Line Mountain
Bethel Park
Elizabethtown Area
East Lycoming
Abington
Bedford Area
South Butler County
Chestnut Ridge
Bermudian Springs
Reynolds
Laurel
Octorara Area
North Pocono
Neshannock Township
Homer-Center
Burrell
Lake-Lehman
Upper Dublin
Mohawk Area
Berlin Brothersvalley
Jamestown Area
Northwestern Lehigh
Valley Grove
Clarion Area
Westmont Hilltop
Oley Valley
Chartiers Valley
Penns Valley Area
Greenville Area
Shaler Area
South Eastern
Wyomissing Area

0.748
0.724
0.723
0.722
0.715
0.707
0.704
0.688
0.687
0.682
0.681
0.670
0.666
0.662
0.656
0.654
0.653
0.650
0.637
0.635
0.633
0.628
0.624
0.620
0.619
0.612
0.604
0.594
0.592
0.579
0.574
0.573
0.572
0.568
0.546
0.533
0.529
0.526
0.524
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Table A3.3: Technical Efficiency Scores and Rankings: Algebra 1
Rank

School District

TE Score

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Quaker Valley
Fairfield Area
Brockway Area
Hatboro-Horsham
United
Millersburg Area
Avella Area
Canton Area
Allegheny Valley
North Star
Brentwood Borough
Jenkintown
Fort Cherry
West Middlesex Area
Penncrest
Shanksville-Stonycreek
Salisbury-Elk Lick
Carmichaels Area
Turkeyfoot Valley Area
Farrell Area
Williamsburg Community

0.518
0.508
0.500
0.491
0.480
0.468
0.461
0.461
0.457
0.456
0.439
0.431
0.424
0.381
0.378
0.376
0.355
0.322
0.291
0.287
0.244
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